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1Abstract
One of the basic characteristic of a modern pluralistic democracy is the existence 
of political parties and an organized opposition. Aside the importance of a representative 
and functioning government, we cherish the existence and functioning of an institutional 
minority within the Congress – the minority party, the opposition. Dwelling into the 
constitutional concept of opposition reviles a more complex and perhaps self-
contradicting picture. We all agree that there should be a minority party, an organized 
political alternative. This party is supposed therefore to oppose the majority party. 
However, must it oppose the majority? Is there a limit to its oppositional activity for 
reasons of majority rule? Are there circumstances where the opposition should be loyal 
and patriotic and refrain from opposing? All these questions are connected to a basic 
tense in modern representative democracy, the one between the majority and the 
opposition within the Congress. This paper seeks to address this problem both 
theoretically and practically and to analyze the constitutional role of the opposition in a 
democracy. 
Furthermore, the understanding of the role of the opposition in democracy 
becomes even more important as we are witnessing national crises and emergencies.  
Especially in these circumstances, opposition behavior is more problematic and deserves 
a special analysis. Should the opposition help the majority in times of crises and suspend 
its activity or must it maintain its political struggle also in these harsh times? Which of 
these behaviors – cooperation or opposition – should be seen constitutionally as loyal or 
patriotic behavior? This paper will seek to address this constitutional problem and answer 
the question, "how patriotic the opposition be?".
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3How Patriotic Can the Opposition Be? The Constitutional Role
of the Minority Party in Times of Peace and During National 
Crises
Yigal Mersel *
If, in times of crisis, the opposition party does 
not function, free government can not work. The party in power 
does not have account for its functions. The public does not 
know what is going on. To rely on the right to vote to preserve 
liberty, when the party in power has no real opposition, is like 
depending on a jury system to preserve justice, when one side is 
represented by a battery of clever and popular lawyers, and the 
other by a tried and confused old man.1
I. The Problem
One of the basic characteristic of a modern pluralistic democracy is the existence 
of political parties and an organized opposition.2 Aside from the importance of a 
representative and functioning government, we cherish the existence and functioning of 
an institutional minority within the Congress – the minority party, the opposition. 
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1 Edna Lonigan, Where Is The Opposition Party? THE HUMAN EVENTS PAMPHLETS No. 10, 6 (1946). 
2 Robert A, Dahl, Preface, at VIII, in POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES (Robert A. Dahl, 
ed.1968).
4Dwelling into the constitutional concept of opposition reviles a more complex and 
perhaps self-contradicting picture. Hence, pluralism is seen as an important value, but 
extreme pluralism is perceived as a danger.3 Political consensus is considered to be a 
desirable outcome, but over-consensus may result in instability and misrepresentation of 
large parts of the society that are not part of the consensus.4  In other words, we all agree 
that there should be a minority party, an organized political alternative. This party should 
therefore oppose the majority party. However, must it always oppose the majority? Is 
there a limit to its oppositional activity for reasons of majority rule? Are there 
circumstances under which the opposition should be loyal and patriotic and refrain from 
opposing? All these questions are connected to a basic tension in modern representative 
democracy, the tension between the majority and the opposition within the Congress. 
This paper seeks to address this problem both theoretically and practically and to analyze 
the constitutional role of the opposition in a democracy. Understanding the role of the 
opposition in a democracy becomes even more important in the context of national crises 
and emergencies.  Particularly in these circumstances, opposition behavior is more
problematic and warrants a special analysis. Should the opposition help the majority in 
times of crisis and suspend its activity, or ought it maintain its political struggle even in 
these harsh times? Which of these behaviors – cooperation or opposition – should be seen 
constitutionally as loyal or patriotic behavior? This paper will seek to address this 
constitutional problem and answer the question, "how patriotic can the opposition be?".
3 Giovanni Sartori, A Typology of Party Systems, in THE WEST EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEM 316 (Peter Mair, 
ed. 1990). 
4 See Robert A. Dhal, Reflections on Oppositions in Westerns Democracies, 1(2) GOVERNMENT AND 
OPPOSITION 7, 13 (1965). 
51. Demonstrating the Problem: The Patriot Act Enactment Proceedings
In order to demonstrate the problematic constitutional status of the opposition in a 
democracy, especially in times of crises, we might use the American legislative response
to the September 11 attack. Indeed, one of the immediate outcomes of the September 11 
tragedy was the enactment of the Patriot Act.5 This law can be seen as an initial 
legislative response to the terror challenge faced by the American nation. It includes a 
variety of provisions intended to provide better tools to combat the threat of terrorism.6
Important as it was to improve the ability of the United States to protect itself from 
terrorism, at least some of the law’s provisions place a heavy burden upon civil liberties 
and basic human rights. The law expands the power of the executive in the long-term. 
One might even question the constitutionality of the law itself7 or of the broad discretion 
it grants to the executive.8
Obviously, the content of the Patriot Act is important, and each of its provisions is 
likely be analyzed by the courts. It is important to note, however, not only the content of 
this law but also the way it was enacted. The Bush administration proposed the legislation 
just eight days after September 11, 2001, and Congress passed it just six weeks later. The 
5 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism ("USA Patriot Act") Act Of 2001, Pub.L.No.107-56, 115 Stat 272 [Hereinafter The Patriot Act]. 
6 See generally Michael T. McCarthy, Note: Recent Developments – USA Patriot Act, 39 HARV. J.ON 
LEGIS. 435 (2002); See also Sara Sun Beale & James E. Felman, Responses To The September 11 Attacks: 
The Consequences of Enlisting Federal Grand Juries in the War on Terrorism: Assessing the USA Patriot 
Act's Changes to Grand Jury Secrecy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 699 (2002).
7
 Ronald Dworkin, Rights and Terror (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); Jenifer C. Evans, 
Hijacking civil liberties: The USA Patriot Act of 2001, 33 LOY.U.CHI.L.J 933 (2002); Shirin Sinnar, Note: 
Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory Detention of Aliens Under the USA Patriot Act, 55 
STAN.L.REV. 1419 (2003).
8 Philip Shenon, Report on U.S. Antiterrorism Law Alleges Violations of Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 
2003, at A1. For a discussion of the dangers to civil liberties resulting from executive discretion in counter-
terrorism, see Philip B. Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in the Aftermath of September 11, 25 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441 (2002).
6vote in the House was 357-66, and in the Senate, 98-1. There are two possible ways of 
understanding the relatively fast enactment and the overwhelming majority in which the 
law passed: The first is that despite the time shortage, Congress was intensively involved
in all the details of the proposal and seriously discussed each one of them, taking into 
account their potential significance on the powers of the executive as well as their
infringement upon basic human rights. On this reading, a broad consensus formed 
through elaborate discussions and compromises achieved in the committees and on the 
floor of each house. Despite the fact that the Congress is dominated by the same political 
party as the president, the minority party struggled and opposed any attempt of the 
executive to come up with a carte blanche type of legislation. Undeterred by the national 
crisis, the minority party – the opposition - used the legislative process to restrict the 
executive's ability to go too far.9 Evidence of this oppositional activity can be found in 
the fact that the final version of the law includes a "sunset" provision which terminates 
the effects of major provision of the law by 2005, making temporary most of the
authority given to the executive.10 Further evidence is the refusal of the Congress to 
enact further legislation at this stage ("Patriot II").11
There is, however, a second way of understanding the passage of the Patriot Act: 
Congress acted almost as a rubber stamp. The executive issued an urgent demand for a 
legislative framework responsive to the national crisis, claiming that any delay might 
invite another terror attack. Under these circumstances, no one wanted to be seen as 
9
 Samuel Issachroff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An 
Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime (forthcoming at 5 THE. INQ. IN L. (2004))(on file 
with the author) at 43-44, available, at: http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/lawsecurity/samfinal.pdf
10
 The Patriot Act, § 224(a).
11 See Audrey Hudson, Patriot II' bid garners little favor on Hill, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, September 12, 
2003, at A1. Patriot II is a law draft initiated by the Bush administration to further empower the executive 
with counter terrorism measures ("Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003") – see David Cole, What 
Patriot II Proposes to Do?, available at: http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/030210cole.pdf. 
7hindering the national effort to overcome the tragedy and to prevent further attacks. The 
minority in Congress demonstrated loyalty to the national interest and did not place sticks 
in the wheels of the legislative machinery. The outcome was legislation passed so 
quickly, one might even question the extent to which Senators and Congressional 
representatives comprehended its long-term effect.12 Indeed, this scenario can explain not 
only the fast enactment but also the sweeping majority in both chambers. 
True or false – or partly true and partly false - the second scenario raises a serious 
problem faced by many democracies, especially in times of national crisis. While it is 
understandable that the legislature supports the executive when the President and the 
Congressional majority are from the same political party, it is harder to reconcile the 
support of the Congressional minority. This minority – the Opposition – is supposed to 
oppose. Its role is to represent and articulate an alternative set of values and policies. This 
role becomes perhaps more important in times of national crisis, when there is a fear of 
excessive use of power by the executive. History provides many examples of executive 
over-reaction in times of national panic.13 This over-reaction is reflected not only in 
executive action but also in rush legislation passed without substantive debate.14 It is 
plausible to inquire, therefore, into the scope of the minority party’s responsibility to 
check and balance the legislature majority and the executive power. Surely, opposing per 
se cannot be the one and only role assigned to the opposition. We expect the opposition to 
oppose but also to be "loyal" and "responsible". There are moments in which 
12 See Dworkin, supra note 7, at 2 ("[Bush Administration] pressured Congress to adapt that Act before 
most Senators and Representatives had had a chance to read it"). 
13 See Dworkin. id, at 1. For a detailed analysis of the reasons for executive over-reaction in times of 
national crisis, see Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be 
Constitutional, 112 YALE.L.J. 1011, 1022-1042 (2003). 
14 See id, at 1032-1033. 
8disagreements and political ambitions should be left aside, so that all national powers can 
be directed toward a single aim. This is, again, especially true in times of national crises
when national unity and safety are at stake.15 In these times, the executive often enjoys 
increased popular support.16 Public opinion and voters - especially the median voter -
expect the opposition to cooperate with the government. Failing to do so – and opposing 
an effort viewed as being in the national interest – might seriously damage the popular 
support of the opposition party. Voters might vote out a disloyal opposition. The dilemma 
poses questions of constitutional theory and practice: How loyal - or patriotic - can the 
opposition be? What degree of opposition activity is acceptable and even required, and 
when does the opposition go too far?17 Trying to answer these questions on a theoretical 
level rather than the factual one, will be the main focus of this paper.
2. The Historical and International Scope of the Problem
The problems of opposition loyalty are not unique to the post-September 11 
American experience. Other national crises, like the Civil War18 and the Second World 
War19, created similar issues. Neither are these problems unique to the United States. 
Different countries tend to face the same dilemma in times of crises. In Britain, for 
15
 A different set of problems, which will not be addressed in this paper, is the role of the opposition and 
the legality of its activity in matters such as judicial nominations or budget. For instance, we might ask 
whether the filibustering of President Bush's nominations by the minority Democratic party constitute 
obstruction of the majority rule and an excessive use of the minority power within Congress.  See   Mike 
Allen, GOP Plans 'Marathon' On Judges Debate to Spotlight Blocked Nominees, THE WASHINGTON POST
November 8, 2003, at A01. 
16 See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Silence During War (unpublished, manuscript on file with the 
author), available, at: http://gking.harvard.edu/files/crisis.pdf
17
 A different question that will not be analyzed here is the argument that courts also tend to become too 
loyal in times of national crisis and war. See id, passim; Gross, supra note 13, at 1034. 
18 See MARK E. NEELY, THE UNION DIVIDED, passim (2002). 
19
 On this loyalty of the Republican Party and its intra-party influences, see RICHARD E. DARILEK, A 
LOYAL OPPOSITION IN TIME OF WAR, passim (Greenwood Press, United States, 1976). 
9instance, the two main parties formed a joint cabinet throughout the two World Wars.
The same had happened during various crises in other democracies like Austria20, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden and Israel21. Moreover, opposition loyalty manifested itself not 
only during times of war but also in the context of counter-terrorism. The English
legislative response to terrorism is procedurally quite similar to the enactment of the 
Patriot Act – speedy deliberation and broad support by the opposition.22 The problem of 
opposition loyalty exists not only in times of national crisis but also in the daily 
functioning of various democracies. Indeed, even in times of peace and tranquility one 
might question whether the opposition has a right to oppose or a duty to do so. If it has a 
right to oppose – what is the nature of this right and how can it be protected? If it has a 
duty to oppose – what is the content of this duty and who should enforce it? In sum, there 
are good reasons to analyze the role of minority party opposition and loyalty, particularly 
in times of national crisis. The enactment procedure of the USA Patriot Act is only an 
example, thus, to a more profound constitutional problem.
3. Lack of Theoretical Attention to the Problem
Studying political opposition as a constitutional institution is a modern 
phenomenon, dating back to the end of the 1960s. Questions were posed mostly in 
political science literature, though it is still regarded as a neglected issue even there.23
Legal analysis of opposition parties is almost nonexistent. Jurists tend to avoid this issue, 
20
 Otto Kirchheimer, The Waning Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes, in COMPARATIVE POLITICAL 
PARTIES 310, 319- 320 (Andrew J. Milnor, ed. 1969).
21
 Robert A. Dahl, Patterns of Opposition, in POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, supra
note 2, at 332, 346 ; Klaus von Beyme, Parliamentary Oppositions in Europe, in OPPOSITION IN WESTERN 
EUROPE 31, 41 (Eva Kolinsky, ed. 1987).  In Israel there was a temporary unification of the two major 
parties in a joint cabinet, for instance, during the 1967 Mideast War. 
22 See Gross, supra note 13, at 1033-1034.
23 See von Beyme, supra note 21, at 31-33. 
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classifying it as a political one. Only a very few democracies refer to the opposition in 
their laws, mostly indirectly or tangentially.24 Perhaps the most basic reason for this 
theoretical lacuna is our tendency to focus on winners rather than losers. We prefer to 
study the use of force and governance, not the problems of the second best.25 Another 
reason for this theoretical lacuna is a deeply-rooted concept of efficient political markets 
which holds that the way a representative votes is not a legal issue. If the opposition or 
minority party decides to cooperate with the majority party, there is no legal dilemma. It 
is simply a political behavior, motivated by political aspirations. If the public does not 
like it, it will show its disapproval in the next elections. In the same vane, according to 
this argument, if the opposition behaves in an obstructionist manner, it will pay the price 
in the voting boxes. Public opinion and democratic competitions are, according to this 
argument, the checks and balances of opposition behavior, and therefore the problem of 
opposition loyalty is a political, rather than a constitutional, issue. 
However, is the answer that simple? If we tend to justify the mere existence of an 
organized minority in our representative assemblies by the most basic constitutional 
principles of liberalism, equality and pluralism than why is the malfunctioning of this 
mechanism merely a political problem? Furthermore, the whole notion of judicial review 
is based on an idea that politics and public opinion do not constitute a sufficient control 
mechanism in a democracy. Courts are willing to intervene in political decisions in the 
name of human rights and basic values, even when the public supports the legislature's 
action. If the legal system is willing to intervene in the decisions and actions of the 
majority, why should it not intervene in the decisions of the minority?  The role of 
24 See, for instance, Parliament of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.p-1, S. 19.1 (Can.); Ministerial and other 
Salaries Act 1975, Ch. 27, s.2 (Eng.).
25 See Eva Kolinsky, Introduction, in OPPOSITION IN WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 21, at 1, 1-2.  
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political opposition has more legal implications than might be apparent, and those 
implications require further analysis.
4. The Proposed Analysis of the Problem
The starting point of this paper is that the minority party – the opposition - plays a 
vital role in modern democracy, not only in terms of its theoretical importance but also
because it is a crucial part of the legislature's procedures and decision making. 
Furthermore, I will argue that important as the opposition role is, there are indeed some 
situations in which it is acceptable that the opposition should be "loyal" and refrain from
opposing or obstructing the majority will.  However, there are limits to the possibility of 
mute opposition. In cases of an unconstitutional proposal of the majority party, I argue 
that the minority party – the opposition - must not remain loyal and even has a duty to 
oppose. The occasional need for political loyalty cannot discharge the political opposition 
from its constitutional duties. The opposition should be regarded therefore, not just as a 
numerical minority but also as a constitutional entity with a specific role - to oppose 
unconstitutional activity by the majority. This role, I will argue, is especially significant 
in times of national crisis and war. Thus, despite the popular pressure to act quickly and 
dramatically in support of majority response to a crisis, the opposition should remain alert 
and maintain its role as a guardian of the constitution.26
26
 My starting point will be therefore that the war against terrorism and the reaction to situations of national 
crises must take place within the law and not as an exception to it. Constitutional law, values and human 
rights should be taken into account even in times of war. See Aharon Barak, Foreword: A judge on 
Judging: The role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV.L.REV 16, 148-160 (2002); Diane P. 
Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 455 (2003); For a different approach, see
Gross, supra note 13, passim. 
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Obviously, this argument raises many questions, primarily regarding the 
applicability and enforceability of this role. It also raises questions about the role of the 
political opposition within the concept of separation of powers and the role of the courts 
in this context. These issues will be discussed below. 
Part II of the paper explains the idea of "opposition" in modern democracies,
taking into account structural differences particular to each country. It also focuses on the 
existence of an opposition in the American presidential democracy while trying to 
challenge the common argument that "there is no opposition in the United States". This
definition of an opposition will be followed, in Part III, by an analysis of the role of the 
opposition in democracy. In this context, I will try to parse some of the common features 
of opposition behavior examined in political science, such as democratic opposition, 
constructive opposition, responsible opposition and loyal opposition. These different 
roles of the opposition will help shed light on the notion of opposition loyalty, especially 
in times of national crisis or emergency. In Part IV, I will argue that the opposition has a 
further distinctive role – constitutional opposition. It will explain the theoretical basis for 
the role of the opposition as well as address the need for constitutional opposition to 
protect the constitution from the majority party. I will also explain why such a 
mechanism is necessary, especially in times of national emergency, and why courts are 
not a sufficient mechanism in this regard. It will be argued also, that there are strong 
reasons for characterizing the role of the opposition as a legal duty, yet not an enforceable 
one. I will conclude, in Part V, by emphasizing the importance of recognizing the legal 
status of the minority party in general, and in times of national crisis, in particular. In this 
context, I will suggest reforms that may promote this goal.
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II. Why Opposition? 
1. Definition and Justifications
The term "opposition" may relate to many kinds of activities within a 
democracy.27 If opposing is about manifesting disagreement with a policy or function of 
another, then many activities can be seen as "opposition". Courts "oppose" governmental 
policy when they overrule it. Individuals "oppose" when they demonstrate against 
government policy. Opposition in the constitutional sense, however – referring to
organized action against the government – is often restricted to parliamentary or 
legislative opposition by the minority party or parties. Our focus will be on this kind of 
opposition, which may be defined as the opposition of the political group (or groups)
which constitutes the minority, to the actions of the group (or groups) which constitutes
the majority, within the representative legislative branch (the congress, national assembly
or parliament), on the basis of different ideologies.28
Britain was probably the first nation to establish a distinct constitutional concept 
of parliamentary opposition. As early as 1826, Sir John Cam Hobhouse noted in the 
House of Commons that in addition to the government, one might also find "His 
27
 There are also oppositions within non-democratic regimes and transitional regimes. In these situations, 
the opposition is either illegal or insignificant, and in any case, it will not have a meaningful role within the 
national assembly or parliament. I will therefore not focus on these types of oppositions. For a more 
detailed description of the role of oppositions in non-democratic states, see Alfred Stepan, Democratic 
Opposition and Democratization Theory, 32 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 657 (1997); Alfred Stepan, On 
the Tasks of a Democratic Opposition, 2 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, 41 (1999). 
28
 For a broader definition of opposition which includes any activity of one group against another, see
Robert A. Dahl, Preface, in POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, supra note 2, at I. This 
definition uses the terminology of minority groups or majority groups, since in multi party systems we 
willusually find a coalition of some parties which constitutes together the majority and also a group of 
political parties which constitute the minority. Another feature of multi party regimes is that the largest 
party in the parliament is not necessarily the majority of the House, as some smaller parties might constitute 
a coalition without it. These distinctions are mostly irrelevant for two parties systems like the United States 
or England. where a coalition is a rare phenomenon and by definition, when there are only two parties, the 
winning party will  always  be the largest party in the Congress and will also constitute the majority party.
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Majesty's Opposition".29 Thus, the representative entity – be it the parliament, the 
congress or a national assembly – consists not only of the majority but also of a 
legitimate minority. This minority does not necessarily represent an ethnic or 
socioeconomic minority within the society but rather an organized political minority 
facing the majority in the legislative assembly.30
Obvious as it might seen, acknowledging the existence of an opposition of this 
kind was not natural, even in Britain, which is seen as originating the concept of 
opposition. Indeed, in the British tradition, opposing the government was regarded as 
treason and could physically endanger those who practiced it.31 Representatives were 
allowed to raise issues affecting their local constituencies, but they could not express 
disagreement over national policy. The legitimacy of dissent is traceable in part to
religious thinking at that time, which encouraged resolving problems and disagreement 
internally, not through public debate.32 In the 18th century, the idea of balanced 
constitution arose, according to which power should be restrained and balanced by a few 
distinctive organs, in order to maintain liberty. Opposing is seen in certain cases, 
therefore, as promoting liberty. However, organized opposition in the parliament or 
systematic dissent was still seen as disloyal activity.33 The American approach to 
29
 Some even date this development to the end of the 18th century – see Nevil Johnson, Opposition in the 
British Political System, 32 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 487, 487-489 (1997).
30 See Marie-Claire Ponthoreau, L'opposition Comme Garantie Constitutionnelle [The Opposition as a 
Guardian of the Constitution], REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIQUE 1127 (2002).
31
 Thomas. A. Hockin, The Roles of the Loyal Opposition in Britan's House of Commons: Three Historical 
Paradigms, 25  PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 50, 52-54 (1971-1972). 
32
 Allen Potter, Great Britain: Opposition with a Capital 'O', in POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN 
DEMOCRACIES, supra note 2, at 3, 5.
33
 For a detailed analysis of the attitude towards the opposition in the 18th century, see J.A.W. GUNN, 
FACTIONS NO MORE: ATTITUDES TO PARTY IN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION IN EIGHTEEN CENTURY 
ENGLAND (1971). 
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opposition did not differ significantly during these periods.34 Though transfers of power –
government alterations - occurred as early as 1801, the leading ideology was still the 
Madisonian concept articulated in the Federalist Papers, describing factionalism as an 
evil. 35 Political parties and organized debate were perceived as a negative phenomenon, 
driven by small, disloyal interest groups.  The opposition was seen not as a legitimate 
party that might one day be in power but rather as a disruptive and potentially seditious 
body.36 The legal implication of this approach was manifested in the Sedition Act of 1798 
which was used as a partisan weapon.37
It was only when legitimized political parties entered the picture in the 19th
century that the idea of organized opposition achieved its modern and current meaning. If 
political parties are the main actors in modern democracy, then the winning party has the 
right and responsibility to rule and form the majority in parliament while representing the 
interests of its voters. On the same basis, the second-most popular party, the loser of the 
elections, has the right to oppose while representing the interests of its own voters. The 
minority party becomes an official opposition with a distinctive role of presenting an 
alternative to the majority and controlling the majority's activities.38
The emergence of the concept of "opposition" in the parliament is not just a side 
effect of partisan democracy but also a necessary consequence of more general 
requirements of liberty and pluralism. Obviously, if the essence of democracy is a 
34 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840, at 1-39 (1969). 
35
 The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
36 See Richard Hofstadter, On The Birth of American Political Parties, in STUDIES IN OPPOSITION 146, 
146-149 (Rodney Barker, ed. 1971). See also Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating 
Institutions, 61 U.CHI.L.REV. 1479, 1484-1496 (1994).
37 Richard Hofstadter, On The Birth of American Political Parties, in STUDIES IN OPPOSITION 146, 149-150
(Rodney Barker, ed. 1971).
38 See GERHARD SCHMID, POLITISCHE PARTEIEN, VERFASSUNG UND GESETZ [Political Parties, Constitution 
and Law], 33-34 (Basel, 1981).
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"general will" type of representative government, as Rousseau defined it,39 then there is 
no place for organized dissent in the legislature, a dissent which is wrong by definition.40
Hence, political theories which emphasize the role of the parliament as representing the 
nation as a whole will view the concept of a legitimate opposition as a negative one.41
Why should there be an opposition in such an ideal type of representation? Furthermore, 
even a minimal definition of democracy as an express of the people's sovereignty does 
not entail the existence of a minority party or an organized opposition in the legislature. 
In theory, the people's sovereignty can be exercised by a single political party which 
claims that it represents the interests and will of everyone.42
In a liberal democracy, however, debate and dissent are essential parts of 
deliberation. There are a few justifications for the existence and activity of an opposition 
within a democracy: First, the assumption is that the best and most just outcome is 
achieved through free and open discussion in which different views and interests are 
expressed.43 This assumption is driven not only by concerns of efficiency but also of 
pluralism. It acknowledges not only the existence of different political views but also that 
39 See JEAN-JAQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 70-74 (Penguin, London, 1968)(1762). 
40
 Jérôme Léron, Pluralisme et Partis Politiques en Droit Public Français [Pluralism and Political Parties in 
the French Public Law], 36-37 (Thèse de Doctorat en Droit, Lyon, 1999)(unpublished Ph.D thesis, on file 
with the author). The same hostility toward opposition exists in general interest Hegelian state theory. See
William E. Paterson & Douglas Webber, The Federal Republic of Germany: The Re-Emergent 
Opposition?, in OPPOSITION  IN WESTERN EUROPE 137, 139 (Eva Kolinsky, ed. 1987). 
41 GHITA IONESCU & ISABEL DE MADARIGA, OPPOSITION – PAST AND PRESENT OF A POLITICAL 
INSTITUTION, 30-36 (1968). These theories – of national will and national sovereignty – are regarded as one 
of the reasons for the negative approach towards oppositions in France. See id, at 58-61. 
42
 This argument was categorically rejected by modern theories of political parties – arguing mainly that a 
party is a part of a whole and there is a party only when there is more than one party in the system. See: 
GIOVANNI SARTORI, PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS 39-50 (1976). For other perspectives, see JEAN 
BLONDEL, COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT 156-164 (2nd. ed. Cambridge, 1995); Brantly Womack, Party-State 
Democracy: A Theoretical Exploration, 25(1) ISSUES & STUDIES 37 (1989).
43 DANIEL A. FARBER , PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND  PUBLIC CHOICE - A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 59-62, 
(1991); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 295-308 (1989).
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these views are legitimate and important in their own right.44 Political rationality depends 
on a plurality of alternatives and their free discussion.45 Furthermore, we acknowledge 
that true  representation of the various groups within the society can be achieved only by 
pluralism in the representative entity itself.46 In other words, the existence of the 
opposition is an essential part of meaningful voting and representation.47
Second, in order to reconcile personal liberty and political equality on the one 
hand and majority rule on the other hand, we must assume real participation of the 
minority in political deliberation.48 Such participation will not only justify why one must 
abide by a law with which he or she does not agree,49 but it also fulfills other goals of 
democratic participation such as personal virtue and democratic education.50 The 
existence of an intra-parliamentary minority is important therefore to legitimate majority 
rule and ensure democratic participation. Majority rule is legitimated by the existence of
a minority that can object and opine on the issues at hand. Furthermore, a deliberative
process based on debating different legitimate views will foster compromise and 
consensus, which serve as important elements of democracy by balancing the inherent 
problems of majority rule.51
A third important idea which underlines the existence of the opposition within the 
legislature is political competition. As modern democracies increasingly focus on the 
electoral phase and less on the daily and long-term representation of the individual, it
44 SARTORI, supra note 42, at  15-16.
45 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 26 (Prometheus, New-York 1986)(1859).
46 RICHARS S. KATZ, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 64-65 (1997).
47
 For the idea of meaningful voting, see Adam Winkler, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U L.REV. 330 (1993).
48 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 286-287 (1949).
49
 Dahl calls this duty to obey the "political obligation" seen as the "unfreedom" of the individual. See: 
Dhal, supra note 4, at 9.  
50 See RENÉ CAPITANT, ÉCRITS CONSTITUTIONNELS [Constitutional Writings], 402 (1982).
51 See HANS KELSEN, LA DEMOCRATIE SA NATURE - SA VALEUR [Democracy – Its Nature, Its Value], 59-60
(Présentation de Michel Troper, 1988)(1929).
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becomes important to maintain real competition within the political market. The
existence of opposition in the legislature promotes political competition. The opposition 
can and should serve as a check on the majority and organize an alternative to the 
majority for the coming elections. Because it sits within the decision-making mechanism, 
it often enjoys better information than other players in the political arena. Democracy 
means majority rule, but that does not exclude the minority's role.52 The fact that there is 
a distinct political minority in the legislature might also promote another important idea, 
the one of separation of powers. In parliamentary regimes, where there is often complete
identity between the legislative majority and the executive branch, a separation between 
the legislature and the executive actually refers to a separation between the opposition 
and the majoritarian government. The separation of powers rationale for the existence of 
an organized minority – a minority party - is also relevant to a presidential democracy 
like the United States . In cases when the same party holds the presidency and dominates
both houses of Congress, the real separation of powers exists between the majority party 
and the minority party – not between the branches themselves. 
In sum, one can argue that there is no majority without a minority,53 and that the 
presence of the opposition in the legislature is not only an important functional feature of 
democracy but even a hallmark of its existence.54
52
 Leron, supra note 40, at 315.
53 HANS KELSEN, supra note 48, at 287.
54
 Dahl, supra note 2, at VIII.  
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2. Opposition to Whom?
Thus far, we have focused on a relatively narrow definition of opposition, 
including the minority party or parties within the legislative branch. This definition 
requires further explanation and fine-tuning. The term "opposition" is inherently relative, 
since it assumes an altera pars which is opposed. Therefore, one might find different 
answers to the question, what is the opposition all about? There are different types of 
oppositions. The most basic distinction, for our purposes, lies in the difference between 
opposing the executive branch on the one hand and opposing the majority party within 
the legislature, on the other hand. 
Indeed, the British concept of opposition – "His Majesty’s Opposition" – was 
based on opposing the executive branch. Thus, in the Westminster model of democracy –
the parliamentary regime – the majority in the House nominates the leader and Cabinet of 
the executive branch. The term “opposition” refers to the members of the House who 
oppose the government or executive branch. The British opposition therefore performs a 
dual function: It opposes the parliamentary legislative majority, and it opposes the 
executive branch. This phenomenon is typical of parliamentary regimes. The executive 
branch is nominated and removed by the parliament. It is responsible to the legislature. 
The legislative minority party simultaneously opposes both the majority party and the 
government or executive branch. The goal of the opposition is therefore to replace the 
government and also to gain a majority in parliament. The opposition can also be easily 
identified as the party that is not in government, because Britain has a two-party system 
in which it is clear that there is a winning party and an opposition party. This feature, 
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combined with the relatively strong coherence and discipline of the British parties, leads 
to the conclusion that Britain's opposition is an opposition with a capital "O".55
In a presidential democracy like the United States, the opposition is divided 
between the different branches of government. In the Congress, the opposition can be 
regarded as the minority party in the House and Senate.  This is the legislative branch 
minority. If Congress is dominated by the president’s party, then the situation resembles a
parliamentary democracy, in which the same party serves as the opposition both to the 
executive branch and to the legislative majority. If, however, the government is divided, 
such that the president's party controls one or none of the chambers, we may speak of an 
opposition only in terms of the minority party within Congress.56 This opposition does 
not necessarily oppose the executive branch since it may belong to the same party as the 
president.57
In a broader sense, it can be argued that the minimal concept of opposition 
requires the existence of a recognized minority party within the legislature. It is a 
minimal concept since in a parliamentary democracy, the opposition is usually regarded
not only as the minority party within the legislature but also as the opposition to the 
executive branch which constitutes an alternative to the government. This feature –
55 Potter, supra note 32, passim.  There is, however, an argument that throughout the years, Britain deviated 
from this classic model of opposition, not in the institutional feature of its two-party system but rather in 
the actual political strength of the British opposition in parliament. See David Denver, Great Britain: From 
an Opposition with a Capital "O" to a Fragmented Opposition, in OPPOSITION IN WESTERN EUROPE, supra
note 21, at 78.
56
 The situation in which the same party dominates both chambers and holds the presidency ("full 
authority") is quite rare, especially taking into consideration the fact that in the Congress, not all members 
are elected at the same election. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV.L.REV
633, 648-653 (2000). See also David A. Crockett, The President as Opposition Leader, 30(2) 
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 245, 250-252 (2000).
57
 There is obviously the possibility, within the American presidential democracy, for a supermajority in 
Congress to impeach and remove the president – see Constitution, Article II Section 4. This procedural tool, 
however, is different – theoretically and practically – from a non confidence vote in a parliamentary 
democracy. 
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opposition to the executive - does not characterize presidential democracies, in which 
there is a strong separation of powers and thus a clear distinction between the minority 
party within the legislature and opposition to the president by the opposing party. Indeed, 
in a presidential democracy, when the government is divided, opposition to the executive 
is manifested by the majority party within the legislature. This kind of "opposition" is 
part of the separation of powers and checks and balances of a presidential democracy. It 
cannot exist in a parliamentary democracy, in which the majority party would lose its 
power if it opposed the executive branch on a regular basis. I will therefore focus on the 
minimal definition of opposition, i.e. the minority party within the legislative branch.
3. "Opposition" In The American Democracy?!
The above distinction between types of democracies, as well as the refinement of 
the definition of opposition, are necessary to refute the common belief, held mostly in 
political science circles, that there is no opposition in the United States or in other 
presidential regimes except in highly exceptional conditions. Perhaps this perspective is 
one of the reasons that American jurisprudence has ignored the legal status of the
minority party in Congress or the opposition.  
Indeed, there are significant differences between oppositions in various
democracies.58 Oppositions vary in concentration, which is the extent to which the 
opposition exists in one major organization, as opposed to being dispersed among several 
organizations; in competitiveness, which is the amount of cooperation or competition 
between the political rivals; in the site of activities, which is where the opposition activity 
58 See Dahl, supra note 21, at 332. For further classifications, see Jean Blondel, Political Opposition in the 
Contemporary World, 32 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 462 (1997).
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takes place (elections, legislative activity, NGO activity, etc.); in distinctiveness, which 
refers to the extent of difference between the opposition and the government or the 
majority; in the goals of oppositions, such as replacing the current government or 
changing its socioeconomic philosophy; and in the different strategies employed by 
different oppositions. 
Based on these parameters, and others, it had been said, descriptively, that in the 
Unites States, "To say where the "government" leaves off and "the opposition" begins is 
an exercise in metaphysics".59 On this view, opposition exists not within Congress but 
rather in the separation of powers; each branch balances another branch, thus "opposing" 
it60. This argument about the lack of opposition in the United States was based primarily 
on specific features of American democracy: oppositional activity is dispersed among 
institutions such as the White House, the House of Representatives, the Senate and the 
judiciary. American federalism means that opposition is also dispersed among state and 
federal entities.61 This lack of concentration weakens the opposition. Furthermore, in 
American society there is broad consensus over core values, such that political cleavages 
are usually minor and are resolved through ad-hoc coalitions, deals and negotiations, not
necessarily according to party lines.62 Uncompromising parties are preserved as 
59
 Robert .A. Dahl, The American Oppositions: Affirmation and Denial, in POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN 
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, supra note 2, at 34.
60
 Nelson. W. Polsby, Political Opposition in the United States, 32 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 511, 
511-512 (1997).
61
 For a further discussion of the influence of federalism on the power of oppositions, see: Carl .J. 
Friedrich, Federalism and Opposition, 1(3) GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 286 (1966). Friedrich argues 
that federalism creates new sites for oppositional behavior within parties and also within other institutions, 
providing the interests of local entities with better representation as oppositions. 
62 See GORDON G. HENDERSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PARTIES 286 (1976). There are perhaps 
stronger disagreements and cleavages within nongovernmental politics – the NGO's, the civil society and 
interest groups. See Dahl, supra note 21, at 343. These, however are not part of the legislature and due to 
the First Past The Post electoral system, can not really pose an opposition to the existing parties.  See
Robert A. Dahl, Some Explanations, in POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, supra  note 2, 
at 348.
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Extremists.63 There is, of course, political competition around elections, but the 
competition is subsequently replaced by a high degree of cooperation.64 Major political 
reforms tend to be achieved on a long-term basis, through consensus and broad public 
support.65 Among different political parties in government there is generally an
agreement over the goals, and the differences in their ideologies are limited to the means 
to achieve these goals. Another factor reducing American opposition is the fact that 
political parties are relatively weak and decentralized, oriented toward the center of the 
political spectrum and competing for the median voter.66 These parties lack cohesive 
power and fail to exercise internal discipline over their delegates. Standing committees in 
Congress are very powerful and thus grant the individual representative independence 
from his party. Minority parties, in particular, have a weak leadership and negative 
incentives to oppose the majority party in a meaningful manner.67 Thus, the argument 
goes, despite the fact that the United States, like Britain, has a dual party system, which 
can foster a strong and distinctive opposition, American opposition is significantly 
weaker than British opposition.68
63 See Nancy L. Rosenblum, "Extremism" and anti Extremism in American Party Politics, 12 J. CONT. LEG. 
ISSUES 843, 873-879 (2002).
64
 Robert A. Dahl, Party Systems and Patterns of Opposition, in THE WEST EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEM, 
supra note 3, at 296, 301.
65 See Polsby, supra note 60, at 518.  
66 id, at 515-516. On further features and reasons for the weakness of the American political parties, see 
John E. Owens, From Committee Government to Party Government: Changing Opportunities for 
Amendment Sponsors in the US House of Representatives, 1945-1998, in THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERS AND LEADERS 75 (Lawrence D. Longley & Reuven Y. Hazan eds. 
2000);  Roderick D. Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, Parties, Committees, and Policymaking in the U.S. 
Congress: A Comment on the Role of Transaction Costs as Determinates of Governance Structure of 
Political Institutions, JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS 676 (1989). See also
CHARLES O. JONES, THE MINORITY PARTY IN CONGRESS 9-19 (1970).
67 See CHARLES O. JONES, THE MINORITY PARTY IN CONGRESS 190-192 (1970).
68
 Dahl explains that there is a direct link between the degree of consensus inside the political structure and 
the existence of an opposition. The broader the consensus, the less legitimate is the opposition. Thus, 
changes within society will be channeled to the political system gradually and not through a distinctive 
opposition with a clear alternative. This might also be a problematic result of a very broad consensus since 
24
It is important to note these features, but we must emphasize their descriptive 
character. They may explain why the American opposition is weak and not 
institutionalized. They cannot completely negate its existence.69 Indeed, recent studies 
show that over the years, American parties have become stronger. At the beginning of the 
21st century, hence, there is more Congressional party cohesion, organization and 
leadership.70 Even if there are indications that American political parties are inherently 
weak, the actual fact of this weakness does not obviate the need for an opposition party 
within a democracy.  The fact that a certain institution in a certain state is weak does not 
lead to the conclusion that it is superfluous and has no role. On the contrary, on a 
normative level, the weakness of the opposition may lead to a call for change. 
My view is that every democracy has an opposition, but structural and social 
differences create different patterns of oppositions. The fact that we find different 
patterns of oppositions should not change our normative legal point of view on the role of 
oppositions in democracies. Parliamentary and presidential systems both require a 
plurality of views within the legislature; control over the majority's power; open public 
debate; and a real alternative to the policies  and actions of the majority. The 
constitutional status of the opposition is important in any democracy. Even in presidential 
democracies, opposition exists. There is always a minority party in the Congress.71 The 
structural differences within various regimes are expressed primarily in the strategies 
it might indicate a political system that is not responding fast enough to social preferences. See  Dhal, supra
note 4, at 9-13. 
69 See Charles O. Jones, The Minority Party and Policy Making in the House of Representatives, in
COMPARATIVE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEMS 431, 431-432  (Herbert Hirsch & M Donald Hancock, eds. 1971).
70 See Barbara Sinclair, The Dream Fulfilled? Party Development in Congress, 1950 – 2000, in 
RESPONSIBLE PARTISANSHIP – THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES SINCE 1950, at 121 (John 
C. Green & Paul S. Herrnson, eds. 2002); ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS 
MEMBERS 267-271 (7th ed. 2000).
71 See JONES Supra note 66, at 1.  
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which oppositions employ, as well as in their power and effectiveness. But these 
differences do not necessarily mean that the opposition does not have the potential to be 
strong, and they certainly do not remove the normative justifications for the presence of 
an opposition.72 Furthermore, a strong separation of powers is not equivalent to a strong 
opposition party. These are different concepts and different mechanisms.  There is a 
difference between a situation in which one branch checks and balances another and a 
situation in which there is an internal opposition within a specific branch.73 The 
legislature's checks and balances on the president in a presidential democracy do not
preclude the checks and balances by the minority party in the legislature. This is 
especially true, taking into account the fact that the majority party in the legislature is in 
the end of the day an essential part of the government as it is the one which enacts the 
laws. The minority party – the opposition – is external to the government.74 Thus, it may 
sometimes be in a better position to criticize both the legislative majority as well as the 
president.  In sum, in a modern democracy there is always an "opposition" and we should 
– at least from a legal point of view - focus not on its de facto existence but rather on its 
normative role. 
72
 Other factors, however, might cause a situation where there is no opposition at all. It has been argued, 
for instance, that in a system with no constitutionally distinct institution that has independent 
responsibilities – like the EU – there is no opposition, not even within the European Parliament. See
Karlheinz Neunreither, Government and Opposition: The Case of the European Union, 33(4) 
GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 419 (2000). 
73 Furthermore, there is an argument that in the United States, the separation of powers tends to lead to 
cooperation between the two parties and not to checks and balances. Internal opposition within the 
Congress is therefore even more important. See Theodore J. Lowi, President V. Congress: What the 
American Two-Party Duopoly Has Done to the American Separation of Powers, 47 CASE W.RES. L.REV. 
1219 (1997).
74 See Armel Le-Divellec, Le Parlementarisme en Autriche [The Parliamentarism in Austria], 1-1998 
REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 145, 168. 
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III. Limits and Duties of Oppositions
Analysis of the nature of opposition, the justifications for its existence and its role 
in different types of regimes is indeed crucial in order to understand what the opposition 
is. This analysis, however, does not by itself enable a better understanding of the exact 
role of the opposition and its interaction with the majority. Even if we assume that it is 
important to have an organized opposition within the legislature, it is still not clear what 
its role is and whether it is limited. The mere idea that the minority party's role is "to 
oppose" might seem simplistic at first glance. One might wonder whether there is a duty 
to oppose or merely the possibility of doing so, and whether the oppositional behavior is 
more of a political phenomenon than a legal concept. Furthermore, though there may be
good justifications and reasons for the existence and function of an opposition in a 
democracy, it is clear – even intuitively – that at a certain point, the opposition should be 
restrained. Excessive oppositional activity might result in a majority decision to ignore 
the minority, which is seeking only disagreement at the expense of consensus. In other 
words, there is a delicate equilibrium between consensus and dissent.75 These questions 
become even more troubling in times of national crisis. Does the fact that the opposition 
has the option of opposing the majority imply an obligation to do so? And should not we 
speak also of an obligation of the opposition to be loyal, to put aside political ambitions
and refrain from oppositional activity during national emergencies? Answering these 
questions requires further understanding of the idea of opposition in modern democracies 
and its justifications.
75 See Dhal, supra note 4, at 13. 
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1. Democratic Opposition
Perhaps the most basic restraint on the minority party in the legislature is its 
democratic character and its adherence to democratic values and ideas. Democracy 
encourages pluralism and diversity. The ideas of pluralism and diversity are based on the 
legitimacy of the different alternatives. Hence, a non-democratic party or opposition is 
not a legitimate one.76 If it does not accept the rules of the game – as a matter of 
principle77 - it can not play it at all. The opposition should oppose the government and not 
the democratic system itself. 78 Its legitimacy is based not on the fact that it rejects the 
existence of the state but rather on the fact that it seeks to promote the general good by 
proposing an alternative plan to the one offered by the majority.79 Hence, we expect the 
opposition to be a democratic opposition.80 There are a number of justifications for 
requiring opposition to be democratic. One is that democracy has the right and 
responsibility to protect itself from its enemies.81 Another is the liberal idea that one 
cannot exploit the freedom granted by a democracy as a platform for destroying that very 
freedom. This requirement that opposition be democratic is a substantive, rather than 
76
 Though it might be seen as legitimate by some of the voters and by parts of the public opinion 
("Exogenous Legitimacy") as well as by its supporters and activists ("Endogenous Legitimacy"). See
Raphael Zariski, The Legitimacy of Opposition Parties in Democratic Political Systems: A New Use For An 
Old Concept, 39(1) THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 29 (1986). 
77
 Kirchheimer's classification of such a party is, thus, "opposition in principle". See Kirchheimer, supra
note 20, at 317-319. 
78
 There may, however, be a variety of interim situations and classifications. See Hans Daalder, The 
‘Reach’ of the Party System, in THE WEST EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 78, 83-84. 
79
 Geraint Parry, Opposition Questions, 32 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 457, 458 (1997).
80
 Other terms are used sometimes to describe the same concept – the one of normal opposition (see Dahl, 
supra note 59, at 35) and the one of constitutional opposition (see Giovanni Sartori, Opposition and 
Control – Problems and Prospects, 1(2) GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 149,151-152 (1965). Further in the 
paper, I will suggest a distinctive meaning for the term, constitutional opposition. 
81 See Walter F.  Murphy, Excluding Political Parties: Problems for Democratic and Constitutional 
Theory, (in), GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW 173, 180 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald Kommers, eds. 1993).
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procedural, requirement of democracy; it looks not merely to the equal representation of 
all views but also at their content.82
Comparative legal analysis shows that many democracies which have faced 
threats to their existence have absorbed this concept of democratic opposition by enacting 
constitutional provisions imposing a duty on political parties to be democratic and 
enabling courts to dissolve an undemocratic party.83 These provisions do not relate to the 
opposition as such but rather to political parties. However, they obviously have 
consequences for  the activities of parties as an organized opposition. 
It is obviously difficult to define when exactly an opposition becomes non-
democratic. An overly narrow definition of “democratic” could serve the interests of 
those in power and exclude important calls for change arising from society. It is not easy 
to find a single, comprehensive definition of democracy.84 Furthermore, democracy faces 
a strategic dilemma of whether to absorb extremists into the democratic arena, thus 
rendering them transparent and getting them used to playing by democratic rules, or to 
exclude them, forcing their activities underground, where they are almost de facto 
immune from control. Disqualifying an opposition party causes also the loss of its effect 
as moderating social pressure.85 On the other hand, an integrated non-democratic 
82 See Gregory Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 389, 395 (Gregory Fox & Brad R. Roth, eds. 2000). It is on this basis that it can be 
argued that a non democratic party is an anti liberal party, objecting core values of democracy, such as 
personal security; personal liberty; religious tolerance; freedom of speech; free elections; separation of 
powers and limits on police usage of force. See Rosenblum, supra note 63, at 852-856. 
83 See Germany – GG, §21(2)[Ger.]; Spain - C.E. §6 [Spa.]; Italy – Cost. §49 [Ital.]. The New Democracies 
in Eastern Europe have mostly similar provisions. See: Hungary – A Magyar Koztarsasag Alkotmanya 
§3(1) [Hun.]; Romania – The Constitution (1991) §8(2); Astonia – The Constitution (1992) §48(3); Poland 
– The Constitution (1997) §. 13. On the relative weak incentive for such a provision in the United States, 
See Dan Gordon, Limits on Extremist Political Parties: A Comparison of Israeli Jurisprudence With That 
of the United States and Germany, 10 HASTINGS INT. & COMP. L.REV. 347 (1987).
84 Martti Koskenniemi, Whose Intolerance, Which Democracy?, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 82, at 436.
85 See IONESCU & DE MADARIGA, supra note 41, at 78-79.  
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opposition has its own dangers. It might help extremists use legislative means to 
legitimize their ideas. It might also adopt an irresponsible policy, making groundless 
promises to the voters in the knowledge that there is no real chance it will have to follow 
through.86 This tendency might also force other parties to become more extremists, trying 
to avoid a leak of voters to the political extremes. 
Because it is so difficult to know where to draw the line, it is rare for a democracy 
to exclude the opposition as non-democratic.87 The call for "change" by a party or faction 
is not – by itself – non-democratic. Similarly, it is legitimate to oppose the personal 
composition of the government and its policies. Opposition parties such as the 
Communist party or other extremists are generally not excluded from the democratic 
competition, despite their problematic agendas, either because of a gap between these 
parties' goals and their actual practice or because of a certain degree of tolerance of non-
86 See Sartori, supra note 3, at 333, for a discussion of the tendency of opposition parties to behave 
irresponsibly. 
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 There are a few examples of democracies who have dissolved political parties, always parties from the 
opposition. See for example cases, from Germany and from Turkey, that reached the European Commission 
of Human Rights or the European Court of Human Rights. See The Communist Party Case, 1 YEARBOOK 
OF EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON H.R. 222 (1955-1957); United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 62
Eur.Ct.H.R. 1 (1998); 26 Eur.H.R.Rep. (1998) 121; The Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, 75 
Eur.Ct.H.R . 1233 (1998); 27 Eur.H.R.Rep 51; Case of Freedom and Democracy Party (Özdep) v. Turkey, 
8 Eur.Ct.H.R.333 (1999); Case of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey, (Apps. No. 
41340/98, 41342/98, 41344/98) Eur.Ct.H.R. (2001) (Third Section) unpublished, at: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=9&Action=Html&X=112213208&Notice=0&Noticem
ode=&RelatedMode=0; followed by Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, (Apps. 
41340/98, 41342/98, 41344/98 Eur.Ct.H.R. (2003)(Grand Chamber), unpublished, at: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=13&Action=Html&X=112213359&Notice=0&Notice
mode=&RelatedMode=0; The Case of Yazar and Others v. Turkey ,(Apps. No. 22723/93, 22724/93, 
22725/93, Eur.Ct.H.R. (2002) unpublished, at: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=10&Action=Html&X=112213325&Notice=0&Notice
mode=&RelatedMode=0; The Case of Demokrasi Partisi v. Turkey, 25141/94 Eur.Ct.H.R.       
( 2002)(unpublished, at:  
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2002/dec/DICLE(DemocraticParty)judepress.htm
It should be noted that not in all the cases the court had actually authorized the ban. The cases where this 
practice was not authorized were cases in which the court had found that there were not sufficient evidence 
for disqualifying the political party and thus the mean used was not proportional to the danger. See for 
instance, Case of Freedom and Democracy Party (Özdep) v. Turkey, 8 Eur.Ct.H.R.333 (1999)
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democratic groups.88 However, violence, incitement to violence, or a declared goal of 
destroying the state are often considered non-democratic and unacceptable oppositional 
behavior.89 Terrorist activity or support of terrorism is impermissible and contradicts the 
basic values of democracy.90 There is no conclusive definition of a non-democratic
opposition. We acknowledge, however, that this concept does exist and might, in certain 
rare situations, lead to actual sanctions against this kind of opposition. Despite the 
structural importance of the very existence of an opposition in a democracy, as well as 
the added value of pluralism and competing ideas, democracy limits the scope of 
opposition to democratic opposition. 
2. Constructive Opposition
There is more to legitimate oppositional behavior than just the requirement that an 
opposition be democratic. We might think that the main and perhaps only role of the 
opposition is to oppose and therefore expect the minority party to vote against any
legislative proposal of the majority and to use all available procedural tools to hinder the 
majority's ability to rule. However, ongoing oppositional behavior of this kind would 
eventually make it very difficult to govern. Furthermore, if the outcome of such behavior 
is obstructing the power of the majority, what is the democratic justification for it? After
88
 More problematic examples in this context of "anti system" parties and oppositions might be the Nazi 
opposition party and the Communist party during the Weimar Republic or the Communist party in Italy in 
the 1950's and 1960's. See Gordon Smith, Party and Protest: The Two Faces of Opposition in Western 
Europe, in OPPOSITION IN WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 21, at 52, 59-63; William E. Paterson & Douglas 
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 Sartori, supra note 80, at 149. 
90 This idea became part of specific laws in democracies threatened by terrorism. Thus, both Spain and 
Israel enacted provisions banning political parties who support terrorism. See Basic Law: The Knesset, 
§7A(3)[Isr.]; Ley Organica 6/2002, de 27 de Junio - Ley de Partidos Politicos [Spa].
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all, the majority’s electoral triumph makes its rule legitimate. It might be even foolish to 
dissent from any majority proposal, since the majority has the power to regulate the 
minority party's procedural rights and could even deny these rights totally.91 On the other 
hand, if the majority has full legitimacy to govern and rule, what is the point of having an 
opposition that is not supposed to oppose?
Indeed, there is serious tension between the minority's right - and even duty - to 
dissent, and the majority 's right to govern. The resolvment of this tension can be based on 
the Roman distinction between potetas (oppose) and imperium (govern). It is difficult to 
justify the existence of the minority if its sole function is to oppose ( potetas). There is no 
point to an institution that exists in order to say "No" to any initiative of the majority. 
Such behavior is ineffective, anyway, because the opposition is a numerical minority. A 
consistent opposition can also be regarded as undemocratic if it regularly obstructs the 
majority on any matter. We should therefore speak not simply about an opposition but 
rather about a constructive opposition. This kind of opposition does not oppose any 
matter as such but rather proposes an alternative ideology or plan. Such an opposition is 
aimed toward governance (imperium) and not mere dissent. It does more than just 
oppose, by combining and even explaining its opposition with its own alternative plan.92
Opposition should be constructive not only to avoid preventing governance by the 
majority, but also to serve some of the justifications for the existence of an opposition in 
first place. Diversity and pluralism are about having different sets of ideas and ideologies, 
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 Brazier points out that this is a case where "Parliamentary realities and constitutional duty in this sense 
go happily hand in hand". See Rodney Brazier, The Constitutional Role of the Opposition, 40 NORTHERN 
IRELAND LEGAL QUARTERLY 131, 138 (1989). 
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 For the distinction between potates and imperium and its implications on opposition behavior, see
IONESCU &  DE MADARIGA, supra note 41, at 13. 
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not just an ideology and an objection to the ideology.93 If we need an opposition because 
we need an alternative plan and the possibility of replacing the government, then the 
opposition must be constructive and offer a real alternative to the majority. 
The concept of constructive opposition has some interesting legal implications. In 
Germany, for instance, though the opposition has the right to vote a non confidence vote 
removing the chancellor, it can do so only if it produces an alternative government - or 
even an alternative policy94 - which enjoys sufficient support.95 A similar mechanism 
exists in other countries.96 Another example is the concept of bone fide use of procedure. 
Indeed, the opposition can use procedural techniques in parliamentary rules and 
regulations in order to place a burden on the ability of the majority to rule effectively. It 
is hard to distinguish, however, between a mala fide usage of a certain technique in order 
to obstruct and a bone fide usage in order to advance a legitimate goal of the opposition.97
One possibility is to check whether the procedure was used not only in order to cause 
difficulty for the majority (oppose – potetas) but in order to rule (imperium) and be 
constructive.
93
 This idea can also be explained in decision making theory: If the opposition has no agenda, then the only 
agenda which exists is that of the government, which decides what matters will come to a vote. This power, 
of setting the agenda, is of a crucial importance and can distort the relative power of the different parties. 
See FARBER &  FRICKEY, supra note 43, at  38-41.
94 See Arnaud Martin, Stabilité Gouvernementale et Rationalisation du Parlementaire Espagnol
[Governmental Stability and the Rationalization of the Spanish Parliament], 41 REVUE FRANCAISE DE 
DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL  27, 54 (2000). 
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 Grundgesetz [GG][constitution] art. 67 [F.R.G.].
96 See Basic Law: The Government, [constitution][Isr.] art 28; La Constitución Española 1978 
[constitution][Spa] art 113. See also Ackerman, supra note 56, at n.46.  
97 See KELSEN, supra note 51, at 64; See also Ponthoreau, supra note 30, at 1152-1156.  
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3. Responsible Opposition
The notion of constructive alternative as one of the oppositional functions lays a 
foundation for a further feature of oppositional and party behavior – responsible 
opposition. If we really want to give the voter - or the public as a whole - the possibility 
of choosing, political parties should offer distinct ideologies for important matters, while 
responding to social changes and cleavages. They should therefore be responsible to the 
voters and the political system as a whole. The opposition, under this idea, must have its 
own agenda which is clear and includes a reference to the main governmental policies 
and activities. It must offer alternative ideas on important matters and highlight the 
differences and distinctive marks of its policy.98 This kind of opposition can be seen as 
accountable.99 Just as the majority is accountable for its policy and functioning, so is the 
opposition. It has a duty toward the public - and not only its voters – to oppose and offer 
a real alternative. Only if the parties have a clear policy, can the voter decide whether to 
vote them in or out, based on their promises. Therefore, we expect a responsible 
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 The concept of party responsibility was first framed in the famous Note: Towards a More Responsible 
Two Party System 44 AM.POL. SCI.REV. supp. (1950). It was later on developed both in the United State 
and in Europe. See: Michael Marsh & M., Pippa Norris, Political representation in the European 
Parliament, 32 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH 153 (1997); Richard D. Hasen, Entrenching 
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MacGregor Burns, Bipartisanship and the Weakness of the Party System, 4 AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 169 
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opposition to keep its promises to the voters.100 Indeed, this approach of responsibility 
assumes that parties and ideologies are the main actors in an efficient and meaningful 
democracy. 
Having discussed this concept of responsibility, we can understand why
oppositions sometimes tend to behave irresponsibly. If, for instance, an opposition party 
knows that there is no real chance that it will be called into government or gain a 
majority, it might adopt an irresponsible policy.101 It is not really accountable and 
therefore not responsible. The opposite situation can also arise. Parties might have an
interest in camouflaging their real ideologies in order to attract the maximum number of 
voters. They then become "catch all" parties, supermarkets of ideologies that can hardly 
be distinctive and cannot be held accountable.102
Perhaps the best example of the concept of opposition responsibility is the British 
practice of "Shadow Government". The opposition party has its own leader who has 
important intra-party powers.103 He or she is actually presented and referred to as an 
alternative prime minister.104 The opposition also forms a "cabinet", which includes 
leading parliament members, each of whom functions as an alternative to one of the 
100 See Sartori, supra note 80, at 149. It should be mentioned, however, that this is merely an expectation 
that is not actually fulfilled in the political reality, for different reasons. See Manfred G. Schmidt, When 
Parties Matter: A Review of Possibilities and Limits of Partisan Influence on Public Policy, 30 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH 155 (1996); Bruce T. Coram, Why Political Parties Should Make 
Unbelievable Promises: A Theoretical Note, 69 PUBLIC CHOICE 101(1991); Kay Lawson,  Partis Politiques 
et Groupes D’intérêt [Political Parties and Interest Groups], 79 POUVOIRS 35, 44-46 (1996). 
101 See Sartori, supra note 80, at 152; Another case of irresponsible opposition is one in which there is 
extreme fragmentation of the political system. This might lead to an opposition which is composed of 
extremist parties which have contradicting ideologies ("bilateral opposition") and thus know that there is no 
chance that they would form a future government together. See Sartori, supra note 3, at 316.  
102 See Otto Kirchheimer, The Catch-All Party, in THE WEST EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 
50.
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 On the way which this leader is usually chosen, see  M. Michaud, Designing the Official Opposition in 
a Westminster Parliamentary System, 1 J. OF LEGIS. STUD. 69 (2000). 
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 Max Beloff, The Leader of the Opposition, 11 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 155 (1957-1958). 
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"real" ministers. The opposition party forms its own agenda and presents it to the public 
as an alternative policy to the governmental one.105
4. Loyal Opposition?
Loyalty is one of the most problematic notions of opposition. Even if an 
opposition is democratic, and even if its functioning is constructive and responsible, it 
may adopt another behavior – that of a loyal opposition. Opposition loyalty assumes an 
incentive of the opposition to help the majority and to carefully choose the cir cumstances 
in which it opposes it. Obviously, the opposition need not help the majority rule, since the 
majority has this power inherently, but it may sometimes have a tendency to facilitate the 
enactment procedure and grant a safety-net to the majority party by minimizing or 
avoiding a political debate on certain issues. Indeed, the phenomenon of majority-
opposition cooperation is not rare by itself, as there are often situations in which political 
parties form a cartel which is aimed at advancing their own benefit or reducing the 
competitiveness of third parties. These are "party cartels", which are usually focused on 
party finance and the formation of entry barriers for competing parties.106
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 The existence of the shadow government serves other important goals as well. It gives the opposition 
leaders and members an opportunity to experiment with governance and executive responsibility, and it 
builds public legitimacy for their actual governance in the future. See Carcassonne, supra note 99, at 33. 
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Opposition loyalty is also a type of party cooperation. However, this cooperation 
is not a cartel aimed at reducing the political competition or achieving financial benefits, 
but rather a cooperation on the basis of mutual interests due to an exceptional social 
reality. These are situations, where the opposition and the majority have strong 
incentives, in terms of public opinion and their constituency, to cooperate one with the 
other. These are, very often, circumstances of an emergency or a national crisis. In these 
situations, the major political parties might cooperate in order to show the public that the 
enacted policy enjoys broad consensus.107 The opposition will often justify this behavior 
in terms of loyalty to national interests. At the same time, the majority will make a real 
effort to cooperate with the minority. What are the incentives for this political cease-fire? 
The majority needs the opposition's support in order to establish public 
confidence in its policies. This manifestation of consensus is also important as a signal to 
other entities – such as enemies during war or world financial markets.108 As a matter of 
practice, the government or majority party might use all kinds of techniques to ensure 
opposition support and loyalty in times of crises. For instance, in addition to public calls 
for "opposition loyalty," the majority may consult with the leader of the opposition or 
some members of the minority party and even disclose classified information to them, on 
the basis of a "gentleman’s agreement" not to use the information as opposition 
propaganda.109
107
 Austria's coalitions after Second World War provide a good example of such a cartel agreement. See
Kirchheimer, supra note 20, at 319-324. Further examples can be found in the American history (the Patriot 
Act of 2001, the Second World War, the Civil War), Sweeden, Italy, Germany and Israel. See supra notes 
18-21. 
108 See Joe D. Hagan, POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND FOREIGN POLICY 3-8 (1993). 
109 Brazier, supra note 91, at 133-134;  See also George H. E. Smith, Bipartisan Foreign Policy in Partisan 
Politics, 4 AM. PERSPECTIVE 157 (1950).
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Opposition loyalty is an interest not just of the ruling party but also of the 
opposition itself. As foreign policy and governance become more complicated and 
demand dynamics and flexibility, it is obvious that not every matter can be decided 
throughout a majority-minority debate. There has to be, thus, a minimum amount of 
opposition confidence in the government.110 Furthermore, during times of crises, public 
opinion might disfavor dissent, especially if the disagreement is seen as hindering the 
efforts of the majority to restore security and calm. Studies have shown an increase in 
support for the government in times of national crisis.111 This political premium gained 
during a crisis is a factor that might deter the opposition from opposing the majority. This
cooperative situation creates a paradox: political cost-benefit calculations might suggest
that in order for the opposition to gain support – or at least not to lose it – it must
cooperate with the government. Adopting this strategy for too long, however, will make it 
difficult for the opposition to persuade the electorate to give it power – why must there be 
a change in government, if the alternative is the same?112 The opposition has an interest 
in cooperating in these situations in order to gain practical experience and public 
legitimacy as a potential future leader. In this state of affairs, the measures necessary for 
the opposition to play a future role as a leader paralyze its current role as an opponent.113
Indeed, there are many kinds of circumstances in which we would expect the 
opposition to be loyal, but the most obvious ones are national catastrophe or an external 
threat.114 War and a massive terror attack are two examples in which the opposition is 
110 See Kirchheimer, supra note 20, at 313.  
111 See Epstein et al., supra note 16, at 9.
112 See IONESCU & DE MADARIGA, supra note 41, at 83-87.  
113 See  Beloff, supra note 104, at 162.  
114
 There are other cases of opposition loyalty which do not involve special circumstances but rather a 
strategic decision of the opposition to concentrate its effort on a few important matters or to avoid erosion 
of its image in the public opinion. For this phenomena, see von Beyme, supra note 21, at 41.  Similarly, 
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expected to put aside its own political agenda and rivalries in order to help the country 
survive and strike back. Only when the clouds of danger have passed can the opposition 
resume its normal activity. In a sense, exceptional circumstances of emergency might 
base an expectation by which the opposition will temporarily sustain its regular 
opposition function. This expectation, as mentioned above, might be based not only on 
patriotic intuition but also on practical advantages such as efficient and responsive 
legislature proceedings, inducement of social consensus and strengthening of national 
unity. 
There is also a further reason for this sudden cooperation of the major political 
rivals, in times of crises. This reason is connected to the type of interests and right that 
are often violated in times of national crises. In times of peace and tranquility, if the 
majority infringes upon basic rights and constitutional values, it would usually be in the 
interest of the opposition to object. The minorities within the electorate which the 
minority party represents would demand such objection.115 In other words, political 
incentives for opposition behavior are strong enough. However, in situations of national 
crises, the "minority" at risk of oppression is not necessarily the parliamentary minority 
or a distinctive group within the society. More often, those threatened by the erosion of a 
constitutional value or infringement of a basic right will not be represented in the 
legislature as such. For instance, granting the police additional powers of detention, 
search and seizure will not necessarily infringe upon the rights of a distinct, represented 
opposition loyalties can also result from a political tradition and culture. I will focus, however, on the 
specific case of national crises, which is an extreme example of the problem of opposition loyalty. 
115
 This kind of argument is based on the assumption that the opposition does represent minorities within 
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not in a two-party system. Kelsen viewed a minority opposition party within a two-party system as 
"artificial opposition". See KELSEN, supra note 51, at 62.  
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minority. These extra powers might even refer to people who have no electoral rights, 
such as illegal immigrants or POW's. These are the rights of the "others".116
Furthermore, many of the means that are used in times of emergency do not 
violate constitutional rights of a certain group in the electorate but rather burden an 
abstract, non-particular interest. This category includes cases of excessive delegation of 
powers from the legislature to the executive branch or laws that are aimed at bypassing 
the judiciary. For instance, the establishment of a separate tribunal system by the 
executive, with no congressional authorization, can be seen as violating the 
constitution.117 Since there is no distinct constituency group which is directly inflicted by 
this kind of violations, the incentive of the opposition to oppose these violations 
decreases dramatically. 
The conclusion is, therefore, that majority-opposition cooperation is feasible 
especially in times of national crises, for a vareity of reasons. The main question is, does 
this political reality match the constitutional role of the opposition in a democracy and the 
justifications for its existence? 
IV. The Constitutional Opposition
Indeed, the political phenomenon of opposition loyalty to the majority raises a 
normative-constitutional challenge. Description aside, it is hard to find a normative 
justification for this intuitive expectation of cooperation in times of crisis. So long as the 
opposition is democratic, so long as it promotes public safety and the existence of the 
116 See Ronald Dworkin, Terror& the Attack on Civil Liberties, THE NEW YORK TIMES REVIEW OF BOOKS, 
Vol 50, November 6, 2003, at 3; Dworkin, supra note 7, at 8. 
117 See Neal K. Katyal, Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 11
YALE L.J. 1259 (2002).
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state, why should it suspend its activities in times of war? If the opposition is acting in a 
constructive manner, if it does not merely oppose but also proposes, why should it stop 
doing so during an emergency, when providing alternatives is arguably even more 
important? Opposition behavior takes on additional meaning in times of national crisis. If 
we add to this equation the fear of excessive use of force by majorities in times of 
emergency,118 then one might argue that a loyal opposition in times of crises is an 
opposition which opposes rather than cooperates.  The opposition should be loyal to the 
public and to democratic values, not to the existing majority and its policy. National 
unity, social consensus and an efficient legislature are important goals, but they can not 
replace the most basic role of the opposition and the reasons for its presence. Opposition 
loyalty, thus, may exist in certain cases but it must be limited. The opposition can not be 
too loyal, too patriotic.
But, when does an opposition become too loyal? What is the border line between 
understandable and perhaps desirable cooperation on the one hand, and unacceptable 
cooperation which results in opposition muteness, on the other? 
My main argument, in reply to this dilemma, would be that the constitutional 
theory of opposition needs to take one step further. The opposition has a unique
constitutional role, especially in times of national crises. This role is too important to be 
left aside for political considerations. Opposition loyalty might be, thus, understandable
in certain cases politically, but unacceptable theoretically. The main argument is therefore 
that the opposition should be regarded not only as a political alternative and a part of the 
legislative machinery, but also as a constitutional institution. The opposition should be 
thus a constitutional opposition. The role of a constitutional opposition goes beyond 
118 See note13, supra.
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being democratic, constructive, and responsible.  A constitutional opposition plays a 
further role – namely as a guardian of the constitution and its basic values.119 Thus, in 
cases where the majority acts in a potentially unconstitutional manner, infringing upon 
basic rights and values of democracy, the opposition should do all it can to obstruct this 
action.120 If the majority party promotes a law which is prima facia unconstitutional, the 
minority party has not just an option but also a constitutional role of opposing it. 
Obviously, the representatives – majority and minority - have the freedom to criticize the 
constitution and even to amend it according to the procedures it lists. They cannot, 
however, violate the constitution unless this violation is according to the constitution 
itself. Therefore, if the majority seeks to violate the constitution, the minority – the 
opposition – has a role of opposing this violation and guarding the constitution. Doing so
is an expression of loyalty, not disloyalty. The opposition thus acts not against the 
constitution but rather as a guarantor of constitutional compliance. Hence, even if in some 
cases we would expect the minority party to facilitate majority action, it should not do so 
in cases involving an unconstitutional infringement on human rights and constitutional 
values. Political loyalty does not trump constitutional loyalty. Consensus, national unity 
and efficient legislatures are important but these can not outweigh basic constitutional 
values. Furthermore, the role of the opposition as a constitutional opposition does not 
119
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depend on public support or a representative idea but is based on the functions and 
justifications of an opposition in a democracy. Therefore, theoretically, the opposition 
should oppose human rights violations or breach of constitutional provisions even if the 
public represented by the opposition does not request this objection and even wants the 
opposition to cooperate with the government. This role of the opposition as a 
constitutional guardian is not limited to times of national crisis but applies even in times 
of peace. The role assumes heightened importance, however, in times of national crisis, 
where human rights and basic values tend to be set aside for "security reasons". 
Especially in these situations, the constitutional opposition should not abandon its role of 
ensuring the proper application of basic constitutional norms. 
The argument in favor of constitutional opposition raises many problems and 
questions that must be confronted. First, what are the theoretical grounds for an 
oppositional role of opposing violations of the constitution? Which doctrinal arguments 
justify it?  
Second, the argument in favor of a constitutional role of the opposition raises 
many practical problems. Even if the opposition needs to oppose unconstitutional 
violations, how will it recognize these violations, especially when the majority will 
almost always deny any unconstitutional behavior? Furthermore, as a practical matter, we 
might ask whether there is any need for such a heavy constitutional burden on the 
opposition. By definition, the opposition is a minority. What is the point of establishing a 
constitutional role on the minority which it cannot carry out? How can the opposition use 
its inherently limited power to protect human rights and the constitution? 
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Third,  even if the role of a constitutional guardian is justified, why is it necessary, 
given the existing mechanism for guarding the constitution and preserving human rights, 
namely the judiciary? If a law is allegedly unconstitutional, it can be challenged in a court 
which practices judicial review. What is the point in adding a further check by an 
institution which lacks substantial power to begin with?
Lastly, even if there are good theoretical and practical justifications for the  
constitutional role of the opposition, there is still a question regarding the nature of this 
role. Should it be characterized as a legal duty? Can it be enforced by the courts? Or 
perhaps it should be only a political directive or a concept of virtues opposition?
Indeed, these questions require an answer, which is actually the need for a further 
understanding of the constitutional analysis of majority- minority interaction as well as the 
nature of the constitutional status of the opposition. We will address these questions in 
order.
1. The Theoretical Justification for Constitutional Opposition 
We should first ask ourselves, on which grounds can we base the idea that the 
opposition has a role of opposing unconstitutional behavior by the majority? A partial 
answer lies in the justifications for the existence of an institutional minority party in the 
first place. One of the primary justifications for the presence of an opposition was the 
need to restrain the power of the government. The assumption is that a pluralism of ideas 
will limit the government's power to infringe upon basic rights. Thus, the opposition 
should have, in theory, an inherent interest in scrutinizing and criticizing governmental 
actions. It should have an interest to do so not only as a matter of protecting the interests 
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and rights of its constituency, but also as a part of its ongoing rivalry with the majority. 
Also, the competition between the minority party and the majority party forces the 
majority itself to consider the rights and interests of the minority, in order to maintain its 
electoral success. Thus, an opposition in the legislature functions mainly to control the 
use of power by the majority and to protect basic rights and constitutional values. 
This argument, regarding the role of the opposition, is mainly an historical and 
conceptual one. It explains why oppositions were formed in the first place and what role 
was assigned to them. But there is a more profound justification for the role of the 
opposition as a constitutional guardian. It can be argued that the constitution itself 
imposes upon the opposition even a duty to oppose unconstitutional behavior of the 
majority. The same democratic constitution that makes it possible for the opposition to 
exist also imposes a duty to oppose unconstitutional violations by the majority.
Two arguments ground this complex yet fundamental idea of constitutional law. 
The first is constitutional supremacy. If the constitution is the supreme law of the land, 
than the legislature cannot breach the constitution unless it amends it according to the 
terms set by the constitution itself. In this context, we usually refer to the legislature as a 
whole and speak about its duty to adhere to the constitution. But who is this legislature? 
Is it only the majority? Why do we narrow this basic constitutional duty to the amorphous 
entity of the legislator, rather than impose it on specific members? More specifically, why 
can we not argue that the opposition has a duty to adhere to the constitution? 
Furthermore, if all state actors must respect the constitution, should not the opposition 
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within the legislature be seen as state actor?121 Hence, the duty of the opposition to 
protect the constitution  derives from the most basic concept of the rule of law. 
The second argument is more axiomatic. It is based on a presumption that a 
system does not permit itself to be breached. Thus, if the constitution formed a legislative 
branch, it did not grant it the power to breach the constitution. The constitution is the 
norm that created the legislative branch and entrenched basic rights.  There is no reason 
to interpret the constitution in a way that allows one part of it to prevail over another or to 
permit the legislature to infringe upon basic rights. One might even argue that basic rights 
trump legislative powers. If this is the case, then the opposition – which is the organized 
alternative within the legislature and is formed through the constitutional provisions 
regarding the legislator – has a duty to be constitutional. It should, therefore, protect the 
constitution. 
In sum, basic notions of democracy and constitutionalism give a firm base to the 
argument that the opposition has a role and function of guarding the constitution.
2. Why Do We Need the Opposition to Oppose Unconstitutional Behavior?
Even if the proposition regarding the constitutional role of the opposition as a 
guardian of the constitution is theoretically sound, there are still many important practical 
questions which must be addressed. Assuming that the opposition should oppose 
unconstitutional violations by the majority, how can the opposition trace these violations?
121
 The precise constitutional status of political parties is a open for debate, and it is unclear whether they 
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It lacks the expertise of constitutional law analysis. Moreover, the majority will usually 
not admit that it violates the constitution. On the contrary, it will justify its policy as 
being completely constitutional. 
 It is true, that for reasons of lack of expertise and the majority's constitutional 
rhetoric, the opposition faces a challenge in identifying unconstitutional violations of the 
majority. These obstacles, however, can be mostly overcome. The opposition may, for 
instance, establish a forum of experts in constitutional law who will evaluate any 
proposed law and opine on its constitutionalism. The opposition may receive assistance 
from NGO's and civil liberty associations. Furthermore, in some democracies, the 
opposition has a constitutional right of referring a law or even a bill to the constitutional 
court for a judicial opinion on its constitutionality.122 Indeed, in most of the cases the 
majority will not admit that the proposed law is violating the constitution. Yet in some 
cases it might admit that the law is not necessarily constitutional. This might be the cases 
in stages of national emergency, when some tend to argue that there is a possibility of 
acting outside the ordinary laws and constitution.123 In these cases, the "constitutional 
alarm" regarding the possible constitutional violation of the law, might be more apparent, 
enabling the opposition to fulfill its role as a guardian of the constitution. Therefore, the 
ability of the opposition to precisely decide which law is allegedly violating the 
constitution is not perfect. It still exists, however. It is applicable no less than is the 
122
 In France, 60 members of the National Assembly can ask the Constitutional Court to review the 
constitutionality of a law. This procedure takes place before the law had become final, as a part of the 
Franch system of pre-view. This provision was added to the 1958 constitution only on 1974, in order to 
fortify the status of the opposition. See La Constitution de 1958 [const.] art. 61 [Fra]. In South Africa, for 
instance, a third of the National Assembly members can apply directly to the constitutional court, 
challenging the constitutionality of a law. See The Constitution of South Africa [const.] art. 80. 
123 See Gross, supra note 13, passim.
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general imperative of the rule of law. We must all respect the constitution even though 
we cannot always be sure when we violate it. 
Even if the opposition can identify cases of prima facia constitutional violations, 
there is still another potential major problem with its constitutional proposed role. 
Arguably, there is no point to minority opposition. Even if there are good theoretical 
justifications for the constitutional role of the opposition, there is still a major difficulty 
with its effectiveness. Indeed, as a minority, the opposition cannot completely prevent the 
majority from violating the constitution. However, there is still a lot it can do. The 
opposition can, in certain cases, delay the legislative machinery by filibustering a 
proposal. It can make use of its powers within the committees and the standing 
committees. It also has the ability to gather important information about the proposed law 
and to force the majority to explain the need for the constitutional violation and to expose 
its scope. More importantly, the opposition can use the media and other means in order to 
alert the public and to create pressure on the majority to redraw its plans. The opposition 
might aim these tactics at specific members of the majority, in order to weaken their
support of the unconstitutional proposal. Even if the law does pass, the opposition may 
still be able to challenge its constitutionality directly or indirectly in court.124
The opposition can use these oppositional activities to show not only the malus in 
the proposed law but also how its goals can be better achieved. Thus, a constructive and 
responsible opposition will give the public and the legislature an alternative plan which 
would achieve the relevant important national interests without violating the constitution. 
By providing an alternative, the opposition remains democratic, even as it opposes the 
124
 For a "list" of the available techniques of opposition obstruction, see Yves Colmu, Vade-Mecum du 
Député Obstructeur, [The Obscuring Deputy], 34 POUVOIRS 121 (1985). 
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law. The opposition should take care not to obstruct the legislative procedure in a way 
that hinders the ability of the state to protect itself. 
The ability of the opposition to set up an alternative coherent plan is particularly 
important in times of national crisis, when there is a demand for harsh legislation in order 
to restore security. Indeed, national crises are often characterized by a demand for 
sweeping executive powers and weakening controls over the use of those powers. 
Sometimes, the government tries to exaggerate the scope of the danger or hide the ways 
in which its policy violates the constitution. In these circumstances, the legislator plays an 
important role in controlling the executive while representing a broader swath of 
interests.125 The opposition within the legislator plays an even more important role. It can 
show that there is a way to combat terror, for instance, while using more proportional 
means or without infringing upon human rights at all. It can question the factual 
assumptions which the government presents and present alternative data and information. 
It can also emphasize to the public that there is a long-term price to pay for violating the 
constitution and that it is dangerous to make it easy for the executive to infringe upon 
basic rights.
3. Why Judicial Review Is Insufficient?
The idea that the opposition has a role of being a constitutional opposition, i.e., 
monitoring and opposing unconstitutional violations of the majority, raises another 
difficulty. It can be argued, that the constitutional organ which guaranties compliance 
with the court is the judiciary. The concept of judicial supremacy places the burden of 
guarding the constitution upon the courts. This is correct - the argument follows- not only 
125 See Issachroff & Pildes, supra note 9.
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in terms of constitutional theory but also in terms of qualification, expertise and power.
Courts are experts in constitutional law and have also powers and procedures which give 
them better tools in analyzing the constitutionality of a law and in needed cases, to grant 
also a proper remedy. 
Indeed, we would do well to distinguish between the role of the courts and the 
role of the opposition in protecting the constitution, especially in times of national crisis.
Courts are the primary organ that can rule on the constitutionality of a law or an 
administrative act and grant an effective remedy in cases of violation. Courts can abolish 
a law or void an administrative act. The opposition cannot. Courts are professional,
impartial reviewers and not political opportunists. Courts are a strong, independent, 
nonrepresentative, and counter-majoritarian institution. No one argues, therefore, that the 
opposition can or should replace courts as the guardians of the constitution.
However, oppositions play an important role independent of the function of the 
judiciary. Courts do not have the option of suggesting an alternative agenda or policy. 
They review the act but usually cannot suggest replacing it with another plan.126 Though 
opposition leaders do not enjoy majority support within society, they do enjoy some 
support and legitimacy that courts may lack in certain cases. The opposition is thus a 
representative institution. It might have better information about certain issues than the 
courts, and it is not bound by institutional restraints. Thus, the opposition can advocate its 
opinion through a constant usage of the media. Opposition officials do not have to be 
impartial. The opposition is not bound by the "political question" doctrine or problems of 
justiciability and standing. Its range of action is not formally defined. These features 
assume heightened importance in times of national crisis. During these periods, courts 
126 See Ponthoreau, supra note 30, at 1135.  
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sometimes fail to see the whole picture. They face a problem of public confidence and 
support.127 Furthermore, constitutional provisions and laws might weaken or disable the 
powers of courts during national crises, for instance, by forming alternative courts and 
tribunals or by explicitly immunizing certain activities from judicial review. These 
restrictions on the judiciary may demonstrate the importance of further checks and 
balances like the opposition. Furthermore, opposition leaders and members might have 
better knowledge and experience in assessing the needs and preferred policy. The 
opposition's activities within the legislature may succeed in blocking some of the 
majority’s unconstitutional bills, by eroding the initial support for them. In doing so, the 
opposition will reduce the amount of pressure on the courts. In addition, the laws enacted 
will likely reach the courts only after a debate in Congress and in public. This debate will 
not only highlight the meaning of the law and the alternatives to it, but it will also delay 
the passage of the law and its eventual consideration before the court. This last feature –
time – is significant in times of national crisis. The public and the majority tend to react 
very strongly in the short term. That period is the most dangerous in terms of 
constitutional violations and excessive use of force. Any justified delay in these 
circumstances will help the legislator and the courts arrive at a reasonable and balanced 
decision, rather than a decision driven by the emotions of the crisis.
The opposition does not provide an alternative mechanism to judicial review by 
the courts but rather supplements and facilitates the ability of courts to protect the 
constitution in times of national crisis.  This role becomes even more meaningful in light 
of the argument that courts also tend to become too loyal in times of national crisis and to 
127 See Eyal Benvenisti, Inter Armas Silent Leges? National Courts and the "War on Terrorism", in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRORISM (Andrea Bianchi ed.) (forthcoming), available, at: 
http://www.tau.ac.il/law/members/benvenisti/articals/Inter%20Armas%20Silent%20Leges-newest.pdf
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give less protection to civil liberties.128 If this is true, an additional check on the majority 
may even be a necessity. The opposition can serve this function in times of national 
crisis. 
4) Should There Be a Legal Duty to Oppose?
The justification of the constitutional opposition concept, both theoretically and 
practically, raises a further question: Is this constitutional role of the opposition a legal 
duty or merely an idea of political virtue? Should there be a mechanism that reviews 
opposition behavior and enforces its constitutional role or that the political market -
primarily elections - should be the one which regulates opposition behavior?
Indeed, the idea that there should be a constitutional duty to oppose might be seen 
as radical, for two primary reasons: The first one is our basic understanding of 
representative government and free mandate. We tend to think of representatives as 
special entities. Though they are a part of the state and constitute the legislature, we grant 
representatives privileges and immunities aimed at enabling them to engage in free and 
independent decision making. This theory is known as the free mandate theory and has 
several historical, practical and theoretical justifications.129  One of the clear implications 
of this theory is that there are no legal restraints over the individual decision making of a 
representative. No court will order a legislative representative to vote this way or 
128 See Epstein et al., supra note 16; Gross, supra note13, at 1034; Benvenisti, supra note130. There are, 
however, judicial opinion – mostly minority ones – which demonstrate willingness to adjudicate 
governmental actions even in times of crises – See Burt Newborne, The Role of Courts In Times of War 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
129 See HANA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION, 168-189 (1967); BERNARD MANIN, PRINCIPES 
DU GOUVERNEMENT REPRESENTATIF [PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT], 260 (1995); 
GEORGE BURDEAU ET AL., DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW], 164-167 (26 éme. éd. Paris, 
1999) 165-166.
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another.130 No voter will be able to sue a representative for his or her vote. Judicial 
review by the courts is exercised based not on the personal votes of the representatives 
but rather on their cumulative effect. Courts review legislative outcomes; they do not 
psychoanalyze the legislators. Therefore, it is problematic to impose a duty on a 
representative to vote in a certain manner, whether it is a duty of the majority party not to 
vote for a proposed law or the duty of the minority party to vote against a proposed law, 
even when the law is unconstitutional. Free mandate theory implies not only the freedom 
to oppose but also the freedom not to oppose.131
A second reason we may be reluctant to impose a positive duty to oppose stems 
from theoretical and practical aspects of separation of powers. A theoretical problem is 
that judicial review is usually limited to a final act of another branch and not of its 
internal management. Thus, courts do not review the voting itself but rather the 
anonymous legislative outcome which is the law. If courts were to review the individual 
vote, they would be seen as putting themselves in the place of each legislator – a violation 
of the separation of powers. There is a difference between instructing someone how to 
vote and reviewing the legality of the final decision on its merits. Hence, since a positive 
enforceable duty to oppose means that a court could order a representative how to vote, it 
is clear why such an order conflicts with the idea of separation of powers. In addition, 
there are practical reasons for courts to refrain from intervening in legislation proceedings 
that have not yet concluded. Courts review a law only when it is final. Until then, there is 
130
 Powel v. McCormick, 391 U.S. 486, 503 (1969). 
131 IONESCU & MADARIGA even argue that the functioning of the opposition as constructive was possible 
only due to the free mandate theory. Thus, so long as the opposition had a duty to obey the commands of its 
supporters, there was no real deliberation or alternative. Only when the opposition was free to form its own 
agenda independently – as part of the free mandate – did the opposition become constructive. Thus, the free 
mandate doctrine is one of the pillars of the existence of an opposition in a democracy. See supra note 41, 
at 43-45. 
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no reason to review it, because it might change or fail to pass at all. Practically, therefore, 
how could a court order the opposition to oppose? An ex-ante order of this kind is 
premature, and an ex-post order is irrelevant since the law is final and had the needed 
majority anyway. 
Beside the theoretical obstacles for the concept of a duty to oppose, one might ask 
whether there is a real point in it? Hence, it might be argued that the concept of 
constitutional opposition can exist also without any duty attached to it. Therefore, the 
opposition should be evaluated politically and by the public on the basis of its actions and 
omissions. One might argue that opposing unconstitutional violations and protecting the 
constitution is important, but this is only a political option which the opposition may or 
may not adapt. The sanction for failing is therefore political and not legal. This argument 
against the legalization of opposition behavior might find strong support in the political 
analysis of opposition loyalty cases. If the political incentives for opposition-majority 
cooperation are so strong, especially in times of crises, then any imposition of a legal 
constitutional duty might be totally ineffective and lead to an erosion and dilution of the 
constitution itself. 
Should the conclusion be that the idea of constitutional opposition ought to be 
seen as a political virtue rather than a legal concept? It is true that the argument against 
the imposition of a legal duty to oppose unconstitutional violations is a strong one, for its 
theoretical and practical reasons. I do think, however, that despite the theoretical and 
practical difficulties, there should still be a legal duty upon the opposition to oppose. 
However, this duty should be regarded as a non enforceable duty.132 This is a duty that 
132
 The idea of a non enforceable constitutional duty is might be seen as a conceptual problem especially in 
terms of positive law. It can be argued, hence that a duty which is not subject to an enforcement mechanism 
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has a firm legal and constitutional basis, but it is still a duty that courts will not enforce. 
Why should the constitutional role of the opposition be characterized, despite all the 
difficulties, as a legal duty? 
First, in terms of rule of law and constitutional supremacy, it is hard to justify an 
exemption of the opposition. Problems of enforceability and the advantages of political 
market regulation cannot change the basic notion and understanding of constitutional 
supremacy and rule of law. They may explain why this role of the opposition should not 
be legally enforced, especially taking into account the pragmatic problems of deciding 
when the majority is violating the law and which is the best strategy to oppose it. 
However, the fact that courts do not review the votes of each individual representative 
does not change the representative's basic constitutional duty to act according to the 
constitution. In discussing the legislature as a whole, we say the legislature must abide by 
the constitution, but that if it fails to do so, courts will review the law. In the individual 
context, however, representatives must act according to the constitution, but there is no 
direct remedy for their failure to do so. Representatives have a duty to adhere to 
constitutional values in their voting, but they are immune from direct legal remedy for 
unconstitutional breach. It is therefore important to distinguish between the duty of a 
representative and the remedy for breaching it. Representatives must always adhere to 
constitutional values and provisions. This is a direct derivative of the concept of 
constitutional supremacy and the rule of law.  If they fail to do so, however, there is no 
direct legal remedy against them as individuals, because of the concepts of free mandate 
seizes to be a legal duty at all. Yet it seems that this pure positivist approach is not always followed, as 
there are cases in which a duty still exists despite its lack of enforcement. See for instance Lawrence G. 
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L.REV. 1212 
(1978). Another example might be the Custom, which is usually seen as a norm despite the fact that it is not 
enforced,  
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and separation of powers, as well as other practical reasons Therefore, if an 
unconstitutional bill is proposed, the opposition has a constitutional duty to oppose it. 
There are no direct legal remedies if it fails to do so, but the lack of remedies does not 
vitiate the constitutional duty. The same duty applies also to the majority party 
representatives. However, in that case, a failure to respect the constitution will result in a
final law subject to judicial review. Hence, on an outcome base level, there is a difference 
between the minority opposition's and the majority's duty. But on a theoretical level, both 
the majority and the opposition have the same duty – to adhere to constitutional values 
and provisions.
A second reason for characterizing the constitutional role of the opposition as a 
legal duty and not merely a political option is the important rhetoric value of such a duty. 
If opposing unconstitutional violations is mainly a political option, then it becomes also a 
part of the political controversy. Violating the constitution might even be seen as a 
legitimate option, as well as not opposing such a violation. In my point of view, this is a 
problematic outcome. The constitution can obviously be amended, and any debate over 
its scope and interpretation is not only possible but also essential in any pluralistic 
democracy. But as long as the constitution has not been amended, its violation is 
impermissible, politically and legally. The majority and the opposition might still come to 
a different conclusion and find sufficient incentives to cooperate while enacting a 
unconstitutional law. This fact should not change the nature of the law as unconstitutional 
and the activity of each member of the legislature who supported the law – or did not 
oppose it – as violating the constitution. Any other rhetoric might undermine the rule of 
law and constitutional supremacy. Furthermore, understanding the role of the opposition 
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as a legal duty – though unenforceable – might result in a better knowledge of the public 
and voters on the precise nature of its representative's activities. Thus, there is a 
difference between an opposition that cooperated with the majority out of loyalty to the 
national interest, and an opposition which did so while breaching its constitutional duty. 
The public might disapprove of unconstitutional behavior and thus create an incentive for
the opposition not to cooperate but to oppose in cases of unconstitutional violations of the 
majority. Another plausible result could be that the political parties themselves would 
debate the adherence of each of them to the constitutional duty. The outcome of such 
debate could be the strengthening of the constitutional values and the political consensus 
over the constitutional supremacy. 
Therefore, I am of the opinion that the role of the opposition as a constitutional 
opposition should be characterized as a constitutional legal duty. This duty is 
unenforceable for theoretical and practical reasons. However, it is still a duty that needs 
to be articulated and preserved despite the strong political incentives to ignore it, 
especially in times of national crises and emergency.   
V. Conclusion
The role of the opposition in modern democracies is complex. I have shown that 
this notion is not a construct of political science but is one of the pillars of democracy. 
The opposition should be analyzed as a distinct institution with specific rights and duties, 
including the duty to be democratic, constructive and responsible. The more problematic 
notion of opposition is the one of opposition loyalty. Thus, we sometimes expect the 
opposition to be loyal to the majority, especially in times of national crisis. However, I 
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have argued that this loyalty must be limited by another role of the opposition – its duty 
to behave as a constitutional opposition. Hence, I have argued, sometimes even during 
national emergencies, the opposition has a role of opposing the majority.  This is the case
when the majority seeks to violate the constitution and infringe upon basic rights of 
individuals who may not be represented. A constitutional opposition must be loyal to the 
constitution. Particularly in times of national crisis, the existence of the opposition and its 
proper functioning are extremely important, since these times are characterized by the 
tendency toward excesses of power by the executive and violations of basic rights. The 
role of opposing constitutional violations has a firm theoretical and practical basis. It does 
not replace judicial review by the courts but is a supplementary device. It should even be 
seen as a legal duty, though not an enforceable one. 
There is understandable concern over regulating and intervening in actions of 
"political" institutions. However, this fear should not lead jurists to ignore the existence 
and role of the opposition. So long as there is a majority, there will be a minority. If we 
want the majority to work well, we need to ensure that the minority works well, too. A 
better understanding of the role of the minority party can have significant implications for 
the legal status of the opposition. Acknowledging the importance of a strong and 
functional opposition, especially in times of national crisis, can result in reforms that 
strengthen the minority party within the legislature. Since the duty to oppose is not an 
enforceable duty, constitutional law should focus on creating the proper institutional 
incentives for oppositional behavior. Such institutional incentives might grant the 
opposition better tools to challenge the minority and narrow the situation of opposition 
loyalty to the majority. Thus, one might reconsider internal congressional rules, for 
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instance, to check whether they give the minority party a fair opportunity to oppose.133
We might ask whether the current constitutional theory and court's rulings regarding
primaries laws and party autonomy fit the desired role of the minority party; whether they 
encourage strong and distinctive responsible parties or rather promote individual non-
partisan politics. We might question, for example, whether  the opposition has sufficient 
time to debate the issues and even use filibustering;134 if it has enough resources to cope 
with the majority and the its control of government bureaucracy;135 and if the powers of 
the House or Senate chairperson or speaker are overly partisan.136  Further questions that 
might be asked are whether the opposition party has a fair chance to access the media and 
express its view; whether it has sufficient information and tools to check and balance the 
majority power;137 whether it can seek redress in court if the majority denies its rights or 
uses oppressive tactics.138 Furthermore, it can be argued that there should be special 
133
 Research shows that most of the internal rules of Congress are the product of partisan needs and 
competition, not created for politically neutral reasons such as efficiency or fairness. See SARAH A. 
BINDER, MINORITY RIGHTS MAJORITY RULES – PARTISANSHIP AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRESS
(1997).  Even if the rules are fair, the majority often decides to deviate from them, oppressing the 
Congressional minority. For a game theory approach to cases in which Congress decides to follow its own 
rules or to deviate from them, see Stanley Bach, The Nature of Congressional Rules, 1989 J.L. & POLICY.
725, 730-731.
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 On this practice and its constitutionality in the United States, see Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Filibuster, 49 STAN.L.REV. 181 (1997).
135 See IONESCU & DE MADARIGA, supra note 41, at 139-140. In Britain, for instance, the opposition 
receives an annual sum of money from the state depending on the number of votes it won in the national 
elections and the number of seats it holds in the in House. This sum is to be used only for intra-
parliamentary purposes, and it is not granted to the party which controls the executive branch, since it is 
assumed that the governmental party has sufficient resources. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 493. Another 
way is to pay salary to the leader of the opposition while recognizing its special status. See The Knesset 
Law, 1994, Sec 16 [Isr.]; Parliament of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-1, s. 62 [Can.].
136 See Ranajit Basu, The Role of The Opposition, 243 CONTEMP. REV. 35 (1983). For a more thorough 
analysis of chairperson neutrality or partisanship, including comparative data, see Marcelo Jenny & 
Wolfgang C. Müller, Presidents of Parliament: Neutral Chairmen or Assets of the Majority?, in 
PARLIAMENTS AND MAJORITY RULE IN WESTERN EUROPE 326 (Herbert Döring, ed. 1995). 
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 On the risk of information manipulation by the majority, see Patti Goldman, Combating the Opposition: 
English and United State Restriction on the Public Right of Access to Governmental Information, 8 
HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L.REV. 249 (1985)
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 Comparative law has a lot to contribute in this context. Some European constitutions are interpreted to 
grant special standing to the opposition in courts – see La Constitution de 1958 [const.] art. 61 [Fra]; 
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mechanisms to amplify the power of the opposition party, especially in times of national 
crisis. For instance, we might advocate for a constitutional reform requiring a 
supermajority to declare a national emergency,139 thus granting the opposition party a 
veto power in some cases. All these means – and others – should be considered in each 
democracy, according to its specific features and constitutional traditions. Together, they 
can form a "code" of rights and duties of the opposition.140 The underlying principle 
behind all of them is that the opposition minority party has an important role in a 
democracy, especially in times of crises and that the legal community cannot – and 
should not – ignore this role. 
True, there has been a decline in the role of parliaments in general and 
oppositions in particular. Direct democracy – initiatives, recall and referendum have 
helped weaken the parliaments and parties. The constant pursuit of consensus has
undermined the legitimacy and role of the opposition.141 The increasing power of interest 
groups, the media and government bureaucracy have weakened both political parties and 
Grundgesetz [GG][const,] art. 93 [F.R.G.]. See Philippe Ardant, Les Développements Récents Du 
Parliamentarisme [Recent Developments in Parliamentarism], 46 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT 
COMPARÉ, 593, 601 (1994). The Jurisprudence of certain European constitutional courts is also interesting 
for its demonstrated willingness to protect the opposition. See, for example, the German case voiding a 
governmental expenditure to be used to fund propaganda by the majority, based on reasons of resource 
equality - The Official Propaganda Case (1977), 44 BVerfGE 125, translated in DONALD KOMMERS, THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 177-181 (1997); A decision invalidating the 
refusal to allow the minority party's representatives to become members of a standing committee - The 
Green Party Exclusion Case (1986)[Germany] 70 BverfGE 324, translated in KOMMERS id, at 170-173; 
The Wuppesahl Case (1989)[Germany], 80 BVerfGE 188, translated in Kommers id, at 174-177; A 
decision invalidating the refusal to allow the minority party's representatives to become members of an 
investigation committee - The Schleswing-Holstein Investigative Committee Case (1978)[Germany], 49 
BverfGE 70, translated in KOMMERS id, at 167-169. Similar trends have emerged in the Spanish 
constitutional court. See: Suzie Navot, The "Sarid" Test After Twenty Years: Re-Examining Judicial Review 
of Parliamentary Decisions, 19 BAR ILAN STUDIES IN LAW 721 (2003)[Hebrew]. 
139 On this idea, including a supermajority requirement, see Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Principles for 
a State of Emergency, (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
140 An example of this kind of code can be found in the Inter Parliamentary Union. See GUIDELINES ON THE 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE OPPOSITION IN PARLIAMENT, THE INTER PARLIAMENTARY UNION, 1999, 
available, at: http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/gabon.htm
141 See IONESCU & DE MADARIGA, supra note 41, at 92-94.  
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oppositions.142 Globalization also plays a role in weakening national parliaments and 
oppositions while subjecting the ability of a party to implement its ideology to regional 
and global constraints.143 However, there is still a need for a pluralism of ideas within the 
legislature; there is still a need for a group within the parliament that constitutes a 
legitimized alternative,144 a group which channels public opinion to the legislature and 
the executive in an open and transparent manner.145 Strengthening the status of the 
opposition should be seen therefore as an important element in preserving 
parliamentarianism and democracy.146 This is especially true in the era of terrorism, when 
it is particularly important to make sure that responses are rational and take long-term 
considerations into account. The heaviest burden is on the majority and the government 
which are accountable.  But democracy is not only about the best use of power but also 
about the safeguards and limits on this power – even in times of national crisis. 
Constitutional opposition should be regarded therefore not as a numerical fact but rather 
as one of the checks and balances in a modern democracy.  
142 See MANIN, supra note 129, at 279-299; Lawson, supra note 100, at 37-45; JAMES JUPP, POLITICAL 
PARTIES 55-59 (1968). 
143 See PIERRE BRECHON, LES PARTIS POLITIQUES [The Political Parties], 144-145 (1999). On the influence 
of the European Union on the role of the opposition in Britain, see Johnson, supra note 29, at 507-508.  
144
 Ponthoreau, supra note 30, at 1138-1139.  
145 Hockin, supra note 31, at 64.  
146 See Hans-Peter Schneider, Developing Trends of Parliamentarism in Germany, in 7 JAHRBUCH ZUR 
STAATS- UND VERWALTUNGSWISSENSCHAFT 225 (Theodore Ellwin, Dieter Grimm et al. eds. Baden-Baden, 
1994).
